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Abstract 
This paper argues that within the class of aesthetic judgments, interesting variations occur depending on whether the judgment 
refers to an artwork or not. Additionally, it is suggested that in order to understand and satisfactorily explain these variations, 
one needs a convincing specification of the notion of “art”. Thus, the main thesis of this paper is that a general theory of aesthet-




What is art? This question can be answered by defining 
“art/artwork”, i.e., by citing individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for attributing the term 
“art/artwork” to an object. Even though such a definitional 
project has been the center of attention in the philosophy 
of art for a long time, today this project seems to have 
gone out of fashion. There are at least three reasons for 
that. 
First, in light of the many failed definitional attempts, it is 
questionable whether the definitional project can ever be 
brought to a successful conclusion. Second, there are 
many interesting questions with respect to art that might be 
answered independently of a satisfying definition of “art.” 
Third, the philosophy of art is a subdiscipline of a more 
general aesthetic science. This more general theory is 
concerned with questions, which do not refer to art in par-
ticular, for example: Are our aesthetic responses to the 
world accompanied by a special sort of experience? What 
differentiates aesthetic from nonaesthetic judgments and 
how can we explain certain semantic and pragmatic fea-
tures of aesthetic judgments?  Interest in these general 
aesthetic questions has increased because developments 
in other fields beyond philosophy (for example, psycho-
logical aesthetics or linguistics) have raised the hope that 
real progress with respect to these general aesthetic ques-
tions could be achieved through interdisciplinary effort. 
However, because a definition of “art” does neither seem 
necessary nor particularly helpful in order to address these 
general aesthetic questions, the interest in such a defini-
tional project declined.  
The aim of this paper is to bring the project of defining 
“art” back on the agenda of aesthetic theorizing. In particu-
lar, I will question the last point just made. I am convinced 
that, despite first appearances, answering some general 
aesthetic questions would in fact profit a great deal from a 
convincing definition of “art.” This thought seems espe-
cially true with respect to the general topic of aesthetic 
judgments. I will argue that within the class of aesthetic 
judgments, interesting variations occur depending on 
whether the judgment refers to an artwork or not. To un-
derstand and explain these variations, a convincing theory 
of art—that is, a convincing definition of our concept of 
“art,” would in fact be very useful.  
Thus, the main thesis of this paper is that a general the-
ory of aesthetic judgments needs to be supplemented by a 
convincing and theoretically fruitful theory of art. In section 
2, I will start with some preliminary remarks. In sections 3–
5, I will then discuss three variations within the class of 
aesthetic judgments that call for a theory of art. 
2. Aesthetic Judgments 
I will concentrate on aesthetic judgments that can be ex-
pressed by uttering sentences of the following form “X is 
-for an aes ”ࢥ“ where “X” stands for a singular term and ”,ࢥ
thetic predicate. Of course, differentiating aesthetic from 
nonaesthetic predicates is no easy task, but one can at 
least give a list of paradigmatic examples: 
-beautiful, graceful, dynamic, vibrant, moving, som :ࢥ
ber, and so on. 
This short list already illustrates how diverse and varied 
aesthetic predicates and judgments are: some are meta-
phorical (e.g., “X is moving”) and some nonmetaphorical 
(e.g., “X is graceful”); some are evaluative (e.g., “X is 
beautiful”) and some are nonevaluative (e.g., “X is dy-
namic”); and so on.  
Let me briefly explain what I mean by “evaluative” here. 
The utterance of “X is beautiful” is evaluative in the sense 
that by uttering this sentence, the speaker conveys that 
she appreciates the perceptual experience of X. This con-
veyed information might be part of the semantic content of 
the sentence “X is beautiful,” as contextualists or speaker 
subjectivists with respect to judgments of beauty would 
claim, or it might be conveyed pragmatically via some kind 
of Gricean implicature or via some other process, as some 
objectivists or hybrid-expressivists could claim.  Fortu-
nately, in the context of this paper it is not important to de-
cide which of these theories is correct.  
That “X is beautiful” is evaluative can be illustrated with 
the following sentence: 
(1) This flower is beautiful, but I don’t appreciate how it 
looks.  
Uttering (1) is highly inappropriate for the following reason: 
Uttering (1) is infelicitous because by uttering the second 
conjunct of the sentence, the speaker denies something 
that she conveys by uttering the first conjunct of the sen-
tence. In this respect, judgments of beauty are comparable 
to judgments of gustatory taste: 
(2) This apple is delicious, but I do not appreciate how it 
tastes. 
However, not all aesthetic judgments are evaluative in this 
sense. Uttering a sentence of the form “X is dynamic,” for 
example, is not evaluative because uttering (3) is not nec-
essarily infelicitous: 
(3) X is dynamic, but I don’t appreciate how it 
looks/sounds. 




That aesthetic judgments of the form “X is ࢥ” vary along 
theoretically important parameters—evaluative versus 
nonevaluative or metaphorical versus nonmetaphorical—, 
depending on which aesthetic predicate one inserts for “ࢥ”, 
is a well known fact. However, what is less well known is 
that there are also interesting variations depending on the 
kind of object to which one attributes the aesthetic predi-
cate. In the context of this paper, variations depending on 
whether “X” refers to an artwork are especially important 
because explaining these variations would benefit from a 
satisfying definition of “art/artwork.” In the following sec-
tions, I will discuss three variations of this sort. 
3. Evaluative Character 
As specified above, the aesthetic judgment expressed by 
“X is beautiful” is evaluative. However, this is only true as 
long as “X” in the statement refers to a non-artwork. As 
soon as one substitutes “X” with a singular term referring 
to an artwork, the aesthetic judgment seems to lose its 
evaluative character. This result can be illustrated with the 
following quote by Thomas Mann: “Schönberg’s Verklärte 
Nacht is [...] beautiful, but [...] insubstantial” (quoted in 
Schmidt-Schütz 2003, 196 [my translation]). There is noth-
ing linguistically wrong or infelicitous with the above quote. 
Changing the quote along the lines indicated in sentence 
(5) would not make it infelicitous either: 
(5) Schönberg’s string-sextet Verklärte Nacht is beauti-
ful, but I do not appreciate how it sounds—it is insub-
stantial. 
This observation can be interpreted in at least two ways:  
(a) The difference between (1) and (5) illustrates that 
judgments of beauty with respect to artworks are not 
evaluative at all. In contrast to “Natural object N is 
beautiful,” the speaker of “Artwork A is beautiful” is not 
conveying the information that she values the 
sounds/looks of A. This is why an utterance of (1) is in-
felicitous, whereas an utterance of (5) is not. 
(b) The difference between (1) and (5) illustrates that 
one has to differentiate aesthetic from artistic evalua-
tions. If someone utters the sentence “Artwork A is 
beautiful,” she is still conveying the information that she 
values the sounds/looks of the artwork in an aesthetic 
respect; however, she is not conveying the information 
that she values the sounds/looks of the artwork in an-
other respect—namely, artistic. This is why, in contrast 
to an utterance of (1), an utterance of (5) is not infelici-
tous.  
Depending on the preferred interpretation, the topic to be 
explained varies, but both explanatory attempts would 
benefit from a theory of art: By following option (a), one 
has to explain why an evaluative aesthetic judgment turns 
into a nonevaluative one as soon as it refers to an artwork. 
Because this variation depends on whether the judgment 
refers to an artwork, the features responsible for this effect 
are probably the features (or are closely related to the fea-
tures) responsible for something’s being an artwork. Thus, 
explaining the variation would benefit from a theory of art 
specifying which features are necessary and sufficient for 
an object to be classified as an artwork.  
By following option (b), one has to explain how aesthetic 
and artistic values are related so that an artwork can have 
one without the other. Artistic values are values that an 
artwork has as an artwork. Thus, our understanding of ar-
tistic values and their relation to aesthetic values would 
surely profit from a theory of art.  
4. Sensitivity to Reference Classes 
Some aesthetic judgments are sensitive to reference 
classes in the sense that whether an utterance of the sen-
tence “X is ࢥ” is correct depends on the reference class 
relative to which the utterance is made. Take a look at the 
following sentence, where “S” refers to a specific natural 
object such as, say, a sunflower: 
(6) S is graceful. 
The utterance of (6) might be correct if the sentence is ut-
tered in a conversational context in which the salient refer-
ence class is the set of sunflowers. Compared to other 
sunflowers S might in fact be graceful. However, in another 
context in which the salient reference class is the set of all 
flowers—including lilies, roses, and so on—uttering (6) 
would be incorrect. After all, compared to roses and lilies, 
S would not be graceful.  In this respect, at least some 
aesthetic judgments are comparable to judgments of the 
form “X is small/tall” (see also Walton 1970, 355).  
Presumably, not all aesthetic judgments are sensitive to 
reference classes in this way. Let us call the judgments 
that are sensitive to reference classes “aesthetic judg-
mentsRC.” Are there any variations with respect to the fea-
ture of sensitivity to reference classes, depending on 
which kind of object—artwork or natural object—
judgmentsRC. refer to?   
Consider the following sentence: 
(7) Piet Mondrian’s Boogie Woogie in New York is vi-
brant/energetic. 
Prima facie, it seems as if (7) exhibits the same kind of 
sensitivity. Uttered in a context in which the reference 
class is the set of De Stijl paintings, uttering (7) is correct. 
However, in a context in which the reference class is the 
set of all paintings (including works of abstract expression-
ism), uttering (7) seems incorrect. After all, compared to 
works of abstract expressionism Boogie Woogie in New 
York is rather static. 
However, the difference between (6) and (7) is that, in 
contrast to judgmentsRC about natural objects, we tend to 
think that in judgmentsRC about art, certain reference 
classes are privileged over others. We regard a conversa-
tional context in which the question is whether Mondrian’s 
Boogie Woogie in New York is vibrant as defective if the 
salient reference class is not the class of De Stijl paintings, 
but a class that includes paintings of abstract expression-
ism (for a similar point, see Walton 1970, 356 ff.).  
That we indeed regard some reference classes as privi-
leged can be illustrated by our behavior. Why do we read 
books on art, attend courses in art history, or take guided 
tours in museums? We do these things (i.e., we turn to 
experts with respect to art) at least partially in the hope 
that their expertise (e.g., their knowledge of artists’ inten-
tions, developments in art history, etc.) will help us to pick 
the privileged reference class in relation to our judg-
mentsRC about art.  
Why do these variations occur (i.e. why do we treat 
some reference classes as privileged) if our judgmentsRC 
refer to art? How should we explain the way in which some 
reference classes are privileged? What features fix the 
privileged classes and how? All of these questions are 
concerned with an effect that depends on whether an aes-
thetic judgmentRC refers to an artwork or not. If we knew 
which features were necessary and sufficient for an object 
to be classified as an artwork, we could investigate which 
features or combination of these features are responsible 




for the characterized effect.  This in turn would allow us to 
characterize the effect in more detail, thereby gaining a 
more robust understanding of it. Thus, our understanding 
and explanation of the described variation in aesthetic 
judgmentsRC would profit from a convincing theory of art. 
5. Psychological Data 
It is unclear whether experimental aesthetics is concerned 
with aesthetic judgments as I have introduced them (see 
section 2). Research participants in these studies are 
rarely asked to judge whether a certain object is beauti-
ful/graceful/vibrant and so on. Instead, in most studies in 
visual aesthetics, the participants are asked to rate certain 
visual stimuli with regard to liking, interest, and affect on a 
seven-point scale ranging from one (not at all) to seven 
(very much); or they are asked to list the stimuli in order of 
preference. To differentiate the judgments that are ex-
pressed by these ratings and preference orderings from 
aesthetic judgments in a more strict and traditional sense, I 
will call them “aesthetic judgmentspsy.” 
In visual aesthetics, interesting effects with respect to 
aesthetic judgmentspsy have been established (for an over-
view, see Palmer et al. 2013). One explanation of these 
effects is based on the fluency theory, which claims that 
the more fluently perceivers can process a visual stimulus, 
the more positive their aesthetic judgmentpsy will be. The 
fluency of processing depends on perceptual aspects—in 
this case, fluency “reflects the ease of low-level, data-
driven operations that deal primarily with surface features 
of the stimulus, or its perceptual form”—as well as concep-
tual aspects—“referring to the ease of high-level opera-
tions concerned primarily with categorization” (Winkiel-
mann et al. 2003, 199-200).   
The fluency theory can explain and predict a whole set of 
interesting effects: (i) preference for larger, more symmet-
rical, more contrastive displays (see Silvera et al. 2002; 
Reber et al. 1998); (ii) preference for displays of categori-
cal prototypes (see Halberstadt 2006; Farkas 2002); (iii) 
preference for displays seen more often (see Cutting 
2003); and (iv) preference for certain spatial compositions 
(see Palmer et al. 2013).  
Even though some of these effects also show up with re-
spect to aesthetic judgmentspsy concerning artworks (es-
pecially (ii) and (iii)), the main thesis of the fluency theory 
is highly problematic if we apply it to those judgmentspsy. 
First, the recent history of art can be viewed as a continual 
process of violating conventions of prior art practices. If the 
fluency theory were correct, then this process has to be 
understood as a process of continually producing aestheti-
cally unappealing works of art.  
Second, in opposition to the fluency theory, experimental 
studies have shown that, at least with respect to artworks, 
participants actually tend to prefer stimuli that are not eas-
ily processed. Even though participants rated certain art-
works harder to process and more ambiguous, they none-
theless preferred them to easier-to-process, unambiguous 
artworks (see Jakesch and Leder 2009; Muth el al. 2015).   
Note that the rated ambiguities are very different in kind. 
Sometimes participants describe them as switches be-
tween multiple inconsistent interpretations, as a complete 
lack of a consistent interpretation, or as a case of visual 
indeterminacy (for an interesting classification of these 
ambiguities, see Muth and Carbon 2016). Despite these 
differences, a visual display that is experienced as am-
biguous in any of these senses is harder to process than 
one that is not. Nonetheless, with respect to displays that 
were known to be artworks, high ratings of ambiguity cor-
related with positive aesthetic judgmentspsy. This is an in-
teresting variation within aesthetic judgmentspsy and it de-
pends on whether they refer to artworks or not.  
Why do people tend to aesthetically prefer artworks that 
are hard to process, whereas with respect to non-artworks, 
it seems to be the opposite? Again, attempts to answer 
this question about aesthetic judgmentspsy would surely 
profit from a convincing theory of art. On the basis of what 
else should we try to explain the abovementioned varia-
tion? If we knew which features are necessary and suffi-
cient for something’s being an artwork, we could investi-
gate which features or combination of these features are 
responsible for the characterized effect, thereby gaining a 
better understanding of it.  
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